To Trade or Not to Trade: The Strategic Trading of Insiders around News Announcements by Adriana Korczak et al.
 
 
To Trade or Not to Trade: The 
Strategic Trading of Insiders 























Department of Economics 
University of Bristol 
8 Woodland Road 
Bristol BS8 1TN To Trade or Not to Trade: 
The Strategic Trading of Insiders around News Announcements 
 
Adriana Korczak, Piotr Korczak and Meziane Lasfer
* 
 
31 October 2009 
 
Abstract 
We argue that insiders’ decisions to trade in short windows before news announcements are 
likely to result from a trade-off between the incentives to capitalize on the foreknowledge of 
the disclosure and the risk of regulatory scrutiny and lost reputation. We provide evidence 
that insider buying is driven by the trade-off, while selling is primarily influenced by the 
deterring effect of the regulatory and reputation risks. We show that insiders strategically 
choose the amount of shares bought ahead of good news announcements. They increase their 
purchases as the price impact of the news goes up, but we find that the amount of shares 
purchased levels off as the news becomes extreme. In contrast, we find that the probability of 
insider selling significantly decreases with the price impact of the forthcoming bad news. To 
further support our arguments on the importance of incentives and disincentives to trade, we 
show that the strategic trading is mainly observed in the most price-sensitive groups of news 
announcements, it is clearly pronounced for best informed executives (CEOs), and that 
trading patterns change with changes in regulations, and insiders with higher reputation at risk 
limit their trading ahead of bad news. 
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To Trade or Not to Trade: 
The Strategic Trading of Insiders around News Announcements 
1.  Introduction 
Studies on the association between stock trading by corporate insiders and subsequent 
significant corporate events emerged as soon as excess returns earned by insiders were 
confirmed in seminal papers by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976) and Seyhun (1986), among 
others. A widely accepted explanation for insiders’ abnormal profits was the superior 
knowledge about their firms’ prospects and the use of this foreknowledge in trading decisions. 
Later alternative explanations focused on insiders’ ability to recognize pricing errors made by 
outside investors and trading against the market sentiment. While many studies provide 
evidence consistent with the latter arguments and document the contrarian trading attitude of 
insiders (e.g., Seyhun, 1992a; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter, 2005), the question on the link 
between insider trading and subsequent corporate events and news announcements remains 
still unanswered In particular, how insiders’ motives and incentives shape their trading 
choices shortly before corporate news announcements? Is the decision to trade on the 
foreknowledge of corporate news the result of a trade-off between benefits and costs of 
trading? Is the probability and the amount of buying (selling) shortly before positive 
(negative) news announcements non-linearly related to the information content of the news 
disclosure? Is the propensity to trade dependent on the board characteristics and the position 
of the insider within the firm? How effective is the change in regulations in mitigating the 
trading propensity of insiders on private information? We construct a unique database of 
119,179 news announcements made by U.K. companies, and 8,086 insider trading events over 
the period 1999-2002, to answer these questions. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that insider trading is more 
prevalent before good than before bad news announcements, and insiders refrain from trading   3
in the blackout periods before earnings disclosures. The magnitude of insider buying before 
good news increases as the information content of the news goes up, suggesting that insiders 
use their foreknowledge to trade profitably. However, as the market reaction to the news 
becomes very large, the potential risks of regulatory scrutiny and lost reputation increase, and 
the insiders’ propensity to trade on the information starts to smooth out. We further uncover 
that in their trading decisions before bad news, insiders strategically choose whether to sell 
rather than how much to sell, and the probability of insider selling significantly decreases with 
the importance of the forthcoming news. We argue that insiders’ decision to sell on private 
information is strongly affected by the regulatory risk and hence they want to avoid any 
suspicion and decide not to trade at all when the forthcoming news is significant. For both 
good and bad news, we find that the results on strategic trading are driven by news in, on 
average, the most price-sensitive categories of announcements. Since it is generally accepted 
that such announcements attract close attention of regulators and media, the finding provides 
further evidence that the regulatory and reputational risks have a significant impact on insider 
trading behavior. 
To further support the arguments on the incentives and disincentives to trade, we 
provide evidence on clearly pronounced strategic informed trading by CEOs, who have the 
best access to information in the firm, while for the case of the chairman the trading 
propensity on insider information is relatively weak. We relate these results to the 
characteristics of the UK corporate governance code, which stipulates that the roles of the 
chairman and CEO should be split, and the chairman is usually a non-executive director, who 
is unlikely to have more information than the CEO. Interestingly, we find that the firm’s 
corporate governance characteristics do not affect the trading propensity. Finally, we find 
some evidence that insider trading patterns change when the regulatory regime becomes 
stricter, and that insiders with higher reputation at risk limit their trading ahead of bad news,   4
consistent with the arguments on the perceived legal and reputational costs of trading. Our 
main findings are also robust to alternative measures of the price impact of the news that 
allow for potential information leakage ahead of announcement and preemption of the 
information content of news by insider trading. 
Our study contributes to the stream of insider trading literature which investigates the 
importance of the decision to trade versus not to trade (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005, 
2008; Huddart et al., 2007; Roulstone, 2008; Kallunki et al., 2009). The novelty of our 
approach lies in the focus on insider trading decisions ahead of all corporate news 
announcements as opposed to other studies that analyze earnings announcement only. This 
allows us to better explore insiders’ incentives and disincentives to trade and the cost-benefit 
trade-off. Insider trading regulations include an explicit ban on trading by corporate insiders 
in the run-up to earnings announcements in the U.K. and in some other jurisdictions. In 
countries in which the bans related to earnings announcements are not introduced at the 
country level, like, for example, in the U.S., the majority of firms include them in their firm-
level insider trading policies (Bettis et al., 2000). In either case, trading shortly before an 
earnings announcement is a clear violation of the rules and can be expected to cause an 
immediate disciplinary action. In this respect, the concept of the strategic decision to trade or 
not to trade driven by incentives and disincentives is of little practical meaning, and a test 
would be to a large extent limited to the question on the effectiveness and enforcement of the 
rules. On the other hand, a broad set of corporate news announcements creates a good testing 
ground. In line with common international practices, U.K. regulations prohibit trading by 
insiders when they are in possession of any information which may constitute inside 
information. However, in practice, inside information is difficult to define. One of the features 
of inside information is a significant effect on the stock price it would have if publically 
available, but it is left to the assessment by an individual what a significant impact is. It is   5
acknowledged that there is no percentage figure that can be set to clearly indicate a significant 
effect (see, Disclosure Rules, FSA Handbook, July 2006, p. 17). As noted by Friederich et al. 
(2002), this creates a large grey area open to interpretation. Hence, we observe a large set of 
specific news directly related to the firm and originating from inside the firm to which one 
can expect corporate insiders to be privy, and for which the insiders have to take a view on 
their price significance. This leads to the importance of individual assessment and 
interpretation, and put together with the incentives to profit from the foreknowledge of the 
announcement, sets the ground for our tests. 
The findings of this paper can be of interest to stock market practitioners. Corporate 
insiders not only play a key role in the creation of shareholder wealth, but also play an 
important informational role in securities markets. A large body of earlier insider trading 
literature documents that insiders outperform the market in their trades, and in this paper we 
shed more light on how insiders make their stock trading decisions when they are thought to 
be in possession of private information. The analysis of insiders’ motives, incentives and 
disincentives can help understand how insider trading can lead to incorporation of private 
information into stock prices. Even though we do not provide direct tests of regulations as we 
focus only on insider trading decisions with the regulatory framework as one of the factors, 
we expect our results to provide information for policymakers and market regulators who 
design and enforce insider trading laws. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on 
U.K. insider trading regulations, Section 3 introduces the literature background and develops 
our hypothesis, and Section 4 introduces the data and methodology. Section 5 presents the 
main empirical findings and Section 6 provides further tests and robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
   6
2.  U.K. Insider Trading Regulations 
Trading by corporate insiders is regulated in the United Kingdom by government 
legislation and non-statutory codes of practice (see, e.g., Hillier and Marshall, 1998; Fidrmuc 
et al., 2006). Insider trading has been a criminal offence in the U.K. since the introduction of 
the Companies Act 1980, and the Criminal Justice Act 1993 sets out the current definition of 
insider dealing. According to this Act, if an individual has inside information through being 
an insider (e.g., a director, employee or shareholder), he must not deal in securities that are 
price-affected by that information. Inside information is defined as information that is related 
to particular securities or a particular issuer, is specific and precise, has not been made public, 
and, if made public, is likely to have a significant effect on the price of the securities. The 
Disclosure Rules published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) acknowledge though 
that there is no percentage figure that can be set to clearly indicate a significant effect, and 
this will vary from company to company (see, Disclosure Rules, FSA Handbook, July 2006, 
p. 17). According to the Criminal Justice Act 1993, an individual found guilty of insider 
trading is liable to a fine or imprisonment. The regulations of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
were supplemented by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (effective from 
December 1, 2001), which introduced civil penalties, such as fines or public censure, for 
market abuse, in addition to the penalties based on criminal prosecution, and delegated insider 
trading laws enforcement power to the FSA. In 2001 the FSA implemented the Code of 
Market Conduct as a standard setting document which gives a thorough guidance on the 
behavior that can be considered market abuse. 
The first U.K. prosecution under the insider trading laws took place in 1981 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). However, the enforcement of the rules remained weak and 
between 1981 and 1998, there were only 17 prosecutions, 12 of which were successful,   7
compared with 57 cases brought in the U.S. in 1997 alone.
1 It is acknowledged that it was 
extremely difficult to prosecute insider trading cases under the criminal law.
2 The first civil 
penalty in the new regime after the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
was imposed by the FSA in February 2004. 
Detailed guidelines on share dealings by corporate insiders are also contained in the 
Model Code, currently part of the Listing Rules issued by the FSA, and first introduced by the 
London Stock Exchange in 1977. The Model Code is a non-statutory code of good practice 
and it imposes restrictions beyond those imposed by law. Its guidelines are aimed to ensure 
that insiders in their trading decisions ‘do not abuse, and do not place themselves under 
suspicion of abusing, inside information that they may be thought to have’ (Listing Rules, 
FSA Handbook, July 2006, p. 131). According to the Model Code, insiders are banned from 
trading in ‘prohibited periods’, which include ‘close periods’ associated with earnings 
announcement, and any periods when there is ‘any matter which constitutes inside 
information in relation to the company’ (Listing Rules, FSA Handbook, July 2006, p. 132). A 
‘close period’ covers 60 days before the preliminary announcement of annual or half-yearly 
results, or 30 days before quarterly results, depending on the reporting frequency. Any 
individual who is identified by law as an insider must not trade in any securities of the 
company without having permission to trade (‘clearance to deal’) from a chairman or a 
director designated in the company for this purpose. The clearance is not given during 
‘prohibited periods’ except for a permission to sell when an insider does not possess any 
inside information and has ‘a pressing financial commitment that cannot be satisfied 
otherwise than by selling the relevant securities of the company’ (Listing Rules, FSA 
Handbook, July 2006, p. 134). 
                                                 
1 See, the speech by  Thomas C. Newkirk and Melissa A. Robertson from the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, delivered on September 19, 1998, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm 
2 See, the speech by Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement at FSA, delivered on March 17, 2007, available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0317_mc.shtml   8
The Companies Act 1985 and the disclosure standards of the London Stock Exchange 
(replaced later by the FSA’s Disclosure Rules) outline the obligations to report stock 
transactions by corporate insiders. Insiders must report their trades to the company no later 
than the fifth business day after the transaction, the company notifies the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) about the transaction no later that the following business day, and the 
information is then disseminated immediately. In practice, in the vast majority of cases, this 
process takes only one day. For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find that for 85% of trades in 
their sample the announcement date coincides with the trading date or the following date. 
 
3.  Literature Background and Hypothesis 
A number of studies analyze the informational role of insider transactions and a 
related question on the need to regulate trading on inside information. Generally, previous 
research finds that corporate insiders outperform the market in their trading and the 
announcements of transactions by insiders reveal information that triggers significant stock 
price reactions.
3 The results indicate that financial markets do not compound private 
information and that there is a wealth transfer from uninformed investors to individuals with 
privileged information. Insiders’ gains and the contending motives for insider trading have 
resulted in controversies as to whether insider trading should be encouraged or regulated. 
Some studies argue that the rules against insider trading prevent prices from reflecting the 
correct value of the firm and, thus, damage market efficiency. It is argued that with insider 
trading, market efficiency increases as prices are likely to reflect both publicly and privately 
held information (Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983). In that case, insider trading 
should be permitted and insiders will trade freely to capitalize on private information without 
incurring any risk of regulatory scrutiny. Other studies suggest, however, that if insiders are 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976) and Seyhun (1986) for earlier evidence on the U.S. market, Ravina and 
Sapienza (2009) for latest findings on the U.S., and Pope et al. (1990), Gregory et al. (1997), Friederich et al. 
(2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for U.K. evidence.   9
allowed to trade freely, non-informed investors become aware of the wealth transfer induced 
by insider trading and will refrain from trading (Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). 
Such attitude will lead to inefficiency and illiquidity. Despite the inconclusive debate among 
law and economics scholars, in practice, laws regulating insider trading are relatively 
common across the vast majority of countries although their level of enforcement differs from 
one country to another (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). The regulators around the world 
have a widespread aim to prohibit trading in securities using material non-public information 
in order to promote fairness of the market and to prevent insiders from abusing their 
privileged position. 
The empirical evidence on how insiders trade when they are in possession of private 
information reveals that they trade several months or even years before significant corporate 
events are announced. These events include takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990), seasoned equity 
offerings (Karpoff and Lee, 1991), stock repurchases (Lee et al., 1992), bankruptcies (Seyhun 
and Bradley, 1997), earnings downturns (Ke et al., 2003), and accounting scandals (Agrawal 
and Cooper, 2008). However, insiders’ propensity to trade is reduced as the event approaches. 
For example, Ke et al. (2003) find little abnormal insider selling in two quarters immediately 
prior to the earnings downturn, and Huddart et al. (2007) and Kallunki et al. (2009) find that 
insiders refrain from trading profitably in short windows before earnings announcements. 
Similarly, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find that the probability of insider selling is driven 
by next year’s decreases in firm’s profitability, and is unrelated to the current year’s changes 
in performance. Furthermore, little association is found between insider trading and the 
subsequent management earnings forecasts (Noe, 1999), the content of earnings 
announcements (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994), and a wide range of non-earnings 
announcements, including dividends news and operational plans (Givoly and Palmon, 1985). 
The decrease in the propensity of insiders to trade on private information just before corporate   10
events can be explained by the increased risks of the regulatory scrutiny and litigation, as well 
as potential political and reputational costs (e.g., Agrawal and Cooper, 2008; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2008). The deterring role of regulations is supported by the fact that insider trading 
patterns are found to change with changes in the securities law (e.g., Garfinkel, 1997; 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). Still, some studies find a strong relationship between insider 
trading and the information content of the proximate earnings releases (Lustgarten and 
Mande, 1995) and uncover that insiders profit from superior knowledge about proximate 
filings of Forms 10-K and 10-Q that contain detailed financial results (Huddart et al., 2007). 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2008) shed more light on the incentives to capitalize on 
private information and disincentives created by legal and reputational risks in their analysis 
of the non-linear link between insider trading and next year’s earnings innovation. They find 
that the likelihood of trading increases with the magnitude of earnings innovation, but it is 
attenuated in the case of extreme news, consistent with the trade-off argument on the benefits 
and costs of trading on private information. In a related study, Roulstone (2008) finds further 
evidence on the non-linear link between insider trading and earnings information for quarterly 
earnings announcements. 
In this paper we extend the approach in Piotroski and Roulstone (2008) and Roulstone 
(2008) and analyze how insiders make their trading decisions just before a broad set of 
corporate announcements. As outlined in Section 2, in the U.K. there is an explicit ban on 
trading by corporate insiders before earnings announcements. Therefore, looking at earnings 
only would tell us little about incentives and disincentives and would be limited to a test of 
the effectiveness of the regulations. On the other hand, an analysis of a large sample of 
diverse corporate announcements allows us to study how insiders make decisions when they 
have discretion on whether to trade or not. Even though regulations prohibit trading on price-
sensitive private information, given the difficulties in defining unambiguously what   11
constitutes price-sensitive information, and the difficulties in enforcement of the insider 
trading rules, insiders are likely to weigh the benefits of capitalizing on their foreknowledge 
of the disclosure and the likelihood of attracting regulatory scrutiny and adverse attention. We 
also look at shorter trading windows closer to the announcement. While Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2008) and Roulstone (2008) analyze trading occurring over a year and over a 
quarter, respectively, before the news hit the market, we look at one calendar month preceding 
the announcement. This allows us to strengthen further the trade-off considerations. The 
regulatory and reputation risk when trading immediately before the news is inevitably larger 
as the link between private information and trading is easier for regulators to prove. 
Moreover, in the case of earnings, insiders are able to foresee the development of the firm’s 
profitability and can manage the timing of their trades, and trade even several quarters ahead 
of the disclosure, as documented by Ke et al. (2003). In contrast, the information advantage 
associated with many other types of corporate announcement is short-lived. The information 
becomes public shortly after it is known to the firm’s insiders and, hence, they have a short 
window of opportunity to profit from their foreknowledge. 
We, therefore, explore in this paper the impact of incentives and disincentives on the 
decision to trade shortly before corporate news announcements. We assume that insiders 
know the information content of the upcoming disclosure and can predict how the market will 
react on the announcement date. On the one hand, we consider insiders’ incentives to use their 
foreknowledge of the forthcoming disclosure to increase their profits by buying ahead of good 
news or to limit their losses by selling ahead of bad news. In the extreme, an insider can buy 
(sell) immediately before the news release and sell (buy) directly afterwards. In that case, the 
news cumulative abnormal return (CAR) can be used as a proxy for the total abnormal profits   12
made on the trade, before transaction costs.
4 However, the news CAR can also be interpreted 
as an additional profit made from trading that an insider would foregone if the trading was 
delayed until after the news release. If the market reaction is small, the potential gains are 
low, and, therefore, there is little incentive to trade. One can argue that, potentially, by trading 
even on information with small information content, insiders can make considerable profits if 
they trade large amounts. However, large volume one-directional trading can create a 
substantial price pressure, and the price impact of the trade can eliminate possible profits from 
the foreknowledge. The increasing information content of the news increases potential gains 
that can be made on the trade and, hence, will increase the propensity to trade. 
On the other hand, the regulation is expected to hinder insiders’ propensity to trade 
before price-sensitive information, and when the abnormal returns are high (i.e., the 
information is highly price-sensitive), the probability of scrutiny by the regulator increases, 
reducing the incentives to trade. This may also bring political costs, reputation damage and 
deteriorated future career prospects when insiders’ activities receive adverse media and 
investor attention. Thus, trading will occur when the optimal cost-benefit trade-off is reached. 
Therefore we expect the probability and the amount of trading to be non-linearly related to the 
level of the information content of the news as reflected in the market reaction on the news 
announcement. Furthermore, as noted by Cheng and Lo (2006), the risk of litigation after 
selling before price decreases and buying before price increases is asymmetric. When insiders 
sell on bad news and the stock price drops, outside investors suffer real losses, and hence the 
risk of a legal action is larger. Insider buying before good news results in outsiders’ 
opportunity losses only. Thus, insiders may be more deliberate when selling on forthcoming 
bad news than when buying on proximate good news. Alternatively, if insiders do not trade 
strategically on private information and trade, instead, for liquidity reasons only, the trades 
                                                 
4 In the U.K. there is no short swing profit rule and insider trading in and out of the stock is permitted unlike in 
the U.S., where the Rule 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires insiders to surrender any 
profit made on transactions that are offset within six months.   13
will be randomly distributed and not necessarily undertaken around news announcements or 
related to the information content of the news. 
Our predictions are related to the implications of the theoretical model in Seyhun 
(1992b). He shows that an increase in the value of private information leads to more insider 
trading, and an increase in sanctions reduces the volume of trading as well as reduces the link 
between the value of private information and the amount of insider trading. 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
We study a universe of regulatory news announcements made by U.K. listed 
companies, constituents of the FTSE All Share index, published between January 1999 and 
December 2002. Our database of news releases includes all regulatory news published in the 
Regulatory News Service (RNS), the approved regulatory information service provided by the 
LSE. The data are hand-collected from Perfect Information. Each record in the database 
includes date and time of the announcement, company’s name and a headline of the 
announcements. The regulatory news announcements cover all types of information 
regarding, among others, financial statements, dividends, operating reports, capital structure, 
restructuring, ownership, company appointments, meetings, deals, transactions and offers. We 
classify each announcement into two broad and eight specific categories. Earnings 
announcements that are explicitly associated with insider trading bans, as detailed in Section 
2, are classified into the Banned (or Earnings) category. The remaining announcements are 
classified into the Not Banned category to reflect the fact that they are not associated with the 
explicitly defined trading ban period. This last category includes Other Results and 
Dividends, Capital Structure, Restructuring, Ownership, Board Changes, General Business 
Information and Miscellaneous. Appendix A lists the examples of news items included in 
each specific category.   14
We collect data on insider transactions from Directors Deals Ltd. The data include 
transaction date, announcement date, company name, transaction type, and price and volume 
of the transaction. In line with previous studies on insider trading in the U.K. and U.S. (see, 
e.g., Gregory et al., 1997; and Ravina and Sapienza, 2009) we focus on open-market stock 
trades, and exclude transactions, such as, exercise of options
5, script dividends, bonus shares, 
rights issues and awards made to directors under incentive plans or reinvestment plans, 
because they are associated with other corporate actions and events and/or they are not 
initiated by insiders, and hence generally not driven by private information. We then match 
data on insider transactions with the news database. Our final sample includes 119,179 news 
announcements and 8,086 insider trading events in 797 firms. In many cases, there is more 
than one news announcement published by a company on the same day, and we treat multiple 
announcements made on the same day as one observation. Altogether, we find 78,251 non-
confounding news observations (65.7% of the total).
6 
We analyze separately good and bad news. We follow Cheng and Lo (2006) and 
define good (bad) news when the abnormal stock returns on the news announcement are non-
negative (negative). We assume that the market reaction to the disclosure can be observed 
immediately on the day of the disclosure and on the following day, when the news attracts 
wider media coverage, particularly if the announcement is made after the stock exchange 
trading hours. The short event window allows us to avoid contamination of our measure by 
other events occurring in a larger window around the disclosure. Therefore, the daily 
abnormal returns are cumulated over days 0 and +1 relative to the news announcement 
(hereafter referred to as CAR News or CAR). We use the market model to compute the event 
                                                 
5 Even though one can argue that insiders may strategically time their option exercises, Gregory et al. (1994) 
document that in the U.K. option exercises are not based on information. For this reason and also to keep our 
sample of trades comparable with previous studies, we exclude acquisitions of shares through option exercises. 
6 To keep full information on news categories, we assign each observation to all relevant categories to which 
individual announcements made on the given day were initially assigned. Therefore, the sum of observations in 
news categories is greater that the total number of news items with unique dates.   15
period abnormal returns, with the coefficients α and β estimated over 260 trading days ending 
31 calendar days before the news announcements, and the returns on the FTSE All Share 
index as the market return. The prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits and are 
collected from Datastream. Our final sample includes 39,617 (50.6%) good and 38,634 
(49.4%) bad news announcements. The good news are fairly evenly distributed over time, 
with the average number of announcements per company of 13.5 in 1999, 2001 and 2002, and 
slightly higher at 14.9 in 2000. The average number of bad news per company ranges from 
12.3 in 2002 to 15.8 in 2000.
7 The pattern in bad news is consistent with the behavior of the 
stock market and general economic conditions that deteriorated significantly after the collapse 
of the dot-com bubble in 2000. 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of buy (sell) transactions over 25 weeks before 
good (bad) news. The number of transaction in each week is scaled by the average weekly 
number of transactions over the 25-week period. Generally, the number of buy transactions 
before good news announcement is relatively constant longer in advance of the 
announcement, and increases 4 weeks immediately before the disclosure. The pattern of sells 
is slightly different. The number of transactions gradually decreases until about four weeks 
before the news announcement, and then rises sharply in the run-up to the disclosure. 
Altogether, the evidence shows that insider trading changes before news announcements and 
insiders use their foreknowledge to trade profitably in the direction of the news. The sharp 
increase in trading can be observed about four weeks before the disclosure, consistent with 
our arguments on the short-lived nature of inside information ahead of many types of 
announcements. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
7 For space consideration the detailed results are not tabulated and available upon request.   16
The evidence in Figure 1 strengthens our argument to look at trading decisions in short 
windows before news announcements, and taken together with the (at least) 30-day trading 
ban periods before earnings announcements outlined in Section 2, motivates our research 
design. While there is no explicit trading ban before the announcement of any non-earnings 
information, we assume that the 30 calendar-day period before every announcement reflects 
the time when insiders may be expected to have information advantage. Therefore, to proceed 
to the tests of our hypothesis, each news observation is matched with insider transactions in 
the news-announcing firm within 30 calendar days before the news announcement day. We 
then define two main variables to reflect the magnitude of trading before the news 
announcement. For each good news announcement, we calculate the percentage Net Buying as 
the number of shares bought less the number of shares sold by the firm’s insiders over the 30 
calendar days before the announcement, scaled by the number of shares outstanding on the 
day of the announcement.
8 A positive value of the variable indicates that insiders increase 
their holdings in the company, possibly trading on the foreknowledge of the favorable news 
(news triggering non-negative CAR). Similarly, for bad news announcement we define the 
percentage Net Selling as the number of shares sold less the number of shares bought by the 
firm’s insiders, scaled by the number of shares outstanding. As in the case of good news, a 
positive value of the variables reflects insiders’ trading consistent with the direction of the 
forthcoming news. The approach to aggregate trading by all insiders in the announcing firm 
follows previous studies on the decision to trade or not (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2008; 
Roulstone, 2008) and is based on the notion that insiders trading on private information will, 
                                                 
8 Scaling by shares outstanding (firm size) follows Roulstone (2008). In light of the evidence that the 
information content of insider trading differs with the level of insider ownership (e.g., Hillier and Marshall, 
2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), it would be interesting to look at the magnitude of trading scaled by directors’ 
holdings. Unfortunately we have very much incomplete information on the holdings to follow that route. Also, 
scaling by insider ownership creates some empirical problems when the (initial) holding is zero or very low.   17
on average, increase holdings before good news and decrease holdings before bad news.
9 
Also, we believe that by netting buyers and sellers we do not lose much information because 
for the majority (92.6%) of news announcements preceded by insider trading, trading goes in 
one direction only (i.e., there are only buy or only sell transactions). To explore the trading 
decisions further, in additional tests we also look separately at trading by selected individuals 
in the firm (CEO and Chairman). 
We complement the analysis with further tests that investigate the occurrence of 
insider trading in the direction of the forthcoming news. We, thus, define a dummy variable 
equal to one if Net Buying before a good announcement is positive or Net Selling before bad 
news is positive, and zero otherwise. If this dummy variable is equal to one, the news 
observation is denoted as News Preceded by Insider Trading, otherwise they are News without 
Insider Trading.
10 Our final sample includes 4,083 good news (10.3% of all good news) and 
1,262 bad news (3.3% of all bad news) preceded by insider trading. 
We estimate the following OLS regression to analyze the determinants of the 
magnitude of trading before news announcements, separately for good and bad news (for 
simplicity of the notation subscript i is omitted): 
Net Trading = β0 + β1 LnSize + β2 Market-to-Book + β3 Past Return 
+ β4 |CAR| + β5 CAR
2 + ε          ( 1 )  
To test for the occurrence of trading, that is, to determine when insiders are net buyers 
before good news announcements and net sellers before bad news announcements, we run the 
following logit regressions separately for good and bad news: 
                                                 
9 In untabulated tests we find that 58% of the news with insider trading are preceded by one trade, 21% of the 
news are preceded by 2 trades, and the remaining 21% of the news are preceded by 3 or more trades. It may be 
interesting to investigate if individual insiders follow with trading if they learn about trading by their colleagues, 
or, on the contrary, decide not to trade if their colleagues trade not to attract too much attention. Nevertheless, 
such behavior, even though not investigated in detail in our paper, is consistent with our hypothesis and research 
design. 
10 Note that the description News without Insider Trading does not necessary refer to news observations not 
preceded by any insider transactions. It also refers to good news preceded by net selling and bad news preceded 
by net buying, as well as to news for which the number of shares purchased and sold over the previous 30 
calendar days are equal.   18
Prob(Trading = 1) = logit (γ1 LnSize + γ2 Market-to-Book + γ3 Past Return 
+ γ4 |CAR| + γ5 CAR
2 + η)             (2) 
Net Trading in Equation (1) is Net Buying in the good news sample and Net Selling in 
the sample of bad news. Trading in Equation (2) is an indicator variable equals to one for 
News Preceded by Insider Trading and zero for News without Insider Trading. 
All models are estimated with firm fixed effects which allow us to control for 
unobservable firm characteristics that may drive differences in trading behavior between 
firms, such as, for example, firm-specific insider trading restrictions or policies (see, Ravina 
and Sapienza, 2009). In the case of trading by corporate insiders in the U.K. it is particularly 
important given the required clearance to deal granted by the chairman or designated director, 
as described in Section 2. By including the firm fixed effects, we compare trading within the 
same firm level institutional setting.
11 Standard errors of the coefficients in all regressions are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level to control for non-independence of observations 
within a firm. 
We focus on the coefficients of |CAR| and CAR
2 (β4, β5, γ4 and γ5 in Equations (1) and 
(2) above). Assuming that insiders know the information content of the disclosure and can 
predict how the market will react when the disclosure is made, their strategic trading on this 
information will be reflected in the link between the probability and/or magnitude of trading 
and CAR. We expect β4 and γ4 to be positive to reflect the higher probability of trading ahead 
of news with a larger market impact, and we expect β5 and γ5 to be negative to reflect the 
lower propensity to trade on disclosures with a very significant impact that are more likely to 
attract regulatory attention. Following the arguments of asymmetric risk of regulatory scrutiny 
with regard to trading before good and bad news (Cheng and Lo, 2006), we expect that the 
                                                 
11 As a robustness test we re-run the regressions without fixed effects. The major results (unreported and 
available upon request) and conclusions are unchanged.   19
disincentives to trade profitably on private information before bad news are relatively stronger 
than for trading before good news.  
We control for the firm’s size, market-to-book ratio and prior stock return. Seyhun 
(1986) finds that the value of stock trading by insiders in negatively related to firm size. On 
the other hand, insider transactions can be associated with portfolio rebalancing needs if 
insiders have large stock and stock option holdings, and the holdings are positively correlated 
with firm size (Huddart et al., 2007). Therefore we have no prior expectations regarding the 
sign of β1 and γ1. By including Market-to-Book and Past Return we control for the well-
documented insiders’ contrarian behavior (Seyhun, 1992a; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter, 
2005). Previous literature finds that insiders tend to buy stocks after weak past stock price 
performance and sell after good performance, and similarly insider trading patterns change 
across market-to-book groups. Insiders tend to sell glamour (high market-to-book) firms and 
buy value (low market-to-book) firms. Based on these findings, we expect the coefficients β2, 
β3, γ2 and γ3 to be negative in our regressions on the sample of good news, as insider buying is 
expected to decrease when the market-to-book ratio and past returns increase, but positive in 
the sample of bad news, as stock selling by insiders is expected to increase for high market-
to-book stocks and stocks with strong past performance. 
We also run a set of regressions that extend specifications of models (1) and (2) and 
include additional corporate governance and compensation variables: 
Net Trading = β0 + β1 LnSize + β2 Market-to-Book + β3 Past Return + β4 LnGrants 
+ β5 Board Independence + β6 CEO/Chairman Duality + β7 Ln Board Size 
+ β8 |CAR| + β9 CAR
2 + ε          ( 3 )  
Prob(Trading = 1) = logit (γ1 LnSize + γ2 Market-to-Book + γ3 Past Return + γ4 LnGrants 
+ γ5 Board Independence + γ6 CEO/Chairman Duality + γ7 Ln Board Size 
+ γ8 |CAR| + γ9 CAR
2 + η)             (4)   20
  Stock and option grants control for diversification motives of insider trades, in 
particular sells. Ofek and Yermack (2000) argue that for efficient diversification of their 
portfolios, insiders should sell an appropriate amount of current holdings in response to new 
grants. Consequently, we expect β4 and γ4 to be positive in the regressions run for the bad 
news subsample. Taking into account the monitoring role of the board, its size can be 
considered an indicator of the governance quality. It is documented that smaller boards are 
more effective in monitoring (e.g., Yermack, 1996). We expect low board independence, 
CEO/Chairman duality and large boards to reflect poorer firm level governance standards, 
resulting in more widespread trading on private information. Consequently, we expect β5 and 
γ5 to be negative and β6, β7, γ6 and γ7 to be positive. Ln Board Size also proxies for the number 
of insiders in the firm which may influence the probability and amount of trading we observe. 
The variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The relevant accounting and 
financial data are collected from Datastream. We use Boardex for governance and 
compensation variables, but the data are limited to 587 (73.7%) of our sample firms, reducing 
the sample to 27,735 good news and 27,459 bad news (70.0% and 71.1% of the initial sample, 
respectively). 
 
5.  Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample. The average magnitude of the market 
reaction to announcements (CAR) is similar for good and bad news, with the mean (median) 
of 3.7% (1.8%) for good news and -3.6% (-1.6%) for bad news, but there is a difference in the 
amount of insider trading before the release of good and bad news. In both absolute and 
relative terms, there are many more cases of insider trading in the direction consistent with the 
information content of the news when the news is good. In the group of bad news we also find   21
that insiders trade before news with a smaller market impact. The mean (median) CAR for bad 
news preceded by insider trading is -2.5% (-1.4%), which is significantly lower in the 
magnitude from the mean (median) CAR for news without insider trading equal to -3.6% (-
1.7%). Together with the result of less prevalent insider trading before unfavorable news 
announcement, these findings clearly document that insiders are more cautious when making 
trading decisions before bad news announcements, possibly due to the asymmetric effect of 
good and bad news on the wealth of outside investors. This result is in line with our 
expectations. Insider trading before good news announcement is rather not affected by the 
information content of the forthcoming disclosure. Even though the mean CAR for news 
preceded by insider trading is lower from the mean CAR for good news without insider 
trading (3.5% versus 3.7%), the reversed is true for sub-sample medians. 
[Table 1 about here] 
To illustrate the relative importance of profits that insiders can make from trading 
ahead of announcements, we compare CAR of news in our sample with the long term 
abnormal returns on directors’ share trading. Based on U.K. data, Hillier and Marshall (2002) 
report the average 120-day cumulative abnormal return of 7.4% following insider purchases 
and -6.3% for insider sales. Considering that the mean (median) CAR for good news in our 
sample is 3.7% (1.8%) and for bad news it is -3.6% (-1.6%), deciding not to trade before the 
news and postponing the trade until after the news announcement can reduce the longer term 
trading profits substantially. Are the profits made from trading ahead of news announcements 
also important in monetary terms? We are only able to estimate the profits (or avoided losses 
for sell transactions) for cases when the trading is actually observed. We first multiply the 
value of every trade executed before the news announcement (taken as the negative value for 
sells) by CAR News. Note that this is a conservative estimate as it only looks at profit, or in 
fact abnormal profit, made over the two days around the news disclosure. We then sum the   22
profits made by every insider every year. For many cases the profit from insider trading is not 
large, possibly reflecting the deterring effect of regulations. The median profit is only GBP 
80. However, for the top 25% of individuals the annual profit exceeds GBP 1,099, and for the 
top 10% it goes above GBP 5,667. When scaled by the insider’s compensation, for the top 
25% of cases the profit exceeds 1.1% of basic salary (0.8% of total compensation), and for the 
top 10% of cases it reaches a substantial 6.3% of salary (5.7% of total compensation).
12 
The univariate analysis of differences in other characteristics presented in Table 1 
reveals some additional interesting results. Consistent with previous evidence, insiders appear 
to adopt contrarian strategies as their buying propensity before good news is concentrated in 
stocks with weaker past performance (-5.7% vs. 3.8%) and lower market-to-book ratios (1.28 
vs. 3.39), and they sell before bad news in mainly good companies (past stock returns of 
33.8% vs. 10.6%, and market-to-book of 6.10 vs. 3.55). For both good and bad news we find 
more insider trading in larger stocks. The diversification motive of trading is not confirmed as 
we find that, generally, insider trading is observed in firms with lower stock and option 
grants. However, we cannot conclude that insiders do not diversify their portfolios in response 
to equity based compensation, as they may be selling in other periods and not immediately 
before news announcements. The results for corporate governance characteristics are 
somewhat mixed. In contrast to the expectations, we find that news with insider trading are 
concentrated in firms where the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, which is considered a 
better quality governance provision. On the other hand, for bad news sample we find a highly 
significant difference in board independence between news with and without insider trading. 
There is more insider trading in firms with less independent board, consistent with the 
argument that insider trading is more prevalent in firms with a lower quality of corporate 
                                                 
12 For space considerations the detailed results are not tabulated and available upon request.   23
governance. Interestingly, we also find more insider trading in firms with larger boards, 
possibly reflecting weaker monitoring (Yermack, 1996).
13 
Table 2 reports the distribution of news across specific news categories, their mean 
and median CAR, and the extent of insider trading before announcement of news across the 
categories. The news announcements are evenly distributed between good and bad news sub-
samples, and the distribution of news across specific news categories is similar in good and 
bad news groups. Miscellaneous is the largest category, followed by Ownership and 
Restructuring news. Not surprisingly, Earnings are the most price-sensitive announcements 
triggering on average 5.9% abnormal return for good news and -7.6% abnormal returns if the 
news is negative. Our results indicate though that insiders are constrained by the regulations 
as their likelihood of trading before Earnings announcements is very low. Consistent with 
Hillier and Marshall (1998), our results indicate that there are only few cases (39 out of 1,733 
good Earnings news and 3 out of 1,707 bad Earnings news) of trading in the ban period. 
Overall, as outlined above, a larger proportion of good news is preceded by insider trading 
compared to bad news, and this holds across all news categories. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Two news categories with the smallest average market reaction in the good news sub-
sample (Capital Structure and Ownership) have the largest proportion of news releases 
preceded by insider trading, suggesting that insiders tend to be net buyers before news that 
generally have a lower information content and hence possibly are less exposed to the risk of 
regulatory scrutiny. However, looking at the trading patterns within the news categories, the 
group of announcements related to Ownership is the only group in which insiders buy before 
significantly more positive news. Beyond that, the analysis of the differences in the strength 
of the forthcoming good news and the decision to trade does not reveal any clear patterns. The 
                                                 
13 Because of the specific distributions of Board Independence, CEO/Chairman Duality and Board Size (the 
observations take very few values of the variable and there are many observations at the median), the results of 
the Wilcoxon test for those variable should be interpreted with caution.   24
findings related to bad news reinforce our conclusions from Table 1. Across all news 
categories, insiders are net sellers before releases with smaller market impact, with the 
difference being highly significant in six out of eight categories. Furthermore, similarly to 
good news, the largest proportion of news preceded by insider trading is observed in 
categories that contain news with, on average, lower market impact (Capital Structure and 
Ownership). 
In sum, our results so far suggest that insiders strategically time their trading before 
news announcement, implying that, before trading, they consider the potential risk of 
regulatory scrutiny and/or lost reputation. First, trading bans are effectively enforced and we 
find virtually no insider trading before earnings announcements. Second, because of the 
asymmetric risk of regulatory scrutiny in case of insider selling and buying (Cheng and Lo, 
2006), we observe less insider trading before negative than positive news and thus, managers 
are likely to try to distance themselves from unfavorable disclosure. Third, the trading before 
news releases is concentrated before news releases that trigger a lower impact, particularly in 
the case of bad news. The possible non-linear relation between the propensity to trade on 
private information and the market impact of the information is addressed in the regression 
analysis discussed in the following section. 
 
5.2.Regression Analysis 
While the discussion in Section 5.1 is based on the analysis that primarily looks at the 
occurrence of insider trading, the regression results presented in Panel A of Table 3 shed 
more light on the determinants of the magnitude of insider trading before news releases in 
good and bad news samples. The dependent variable in the sample of good news is the 
percentage Net Buying, defined as the number of shares bought less the number of shares sold 
by the firm’s insiders over 30 calendar days before the news release, scaled by the number of   25
shares outstanding. Correspondingly, the dependent variable in the sample of bad news is the 
percentage Net Selling, defined as the number of shares sold less the number of shares bought, 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding. We find that insiders trade profitably using the 
foreknowledge of the information content of the disclosure before good news announcements. 
The coefficient of |CAR| News is positive and significant, suggesting that that the amount of 
insider buying before the announcement increases as the information content of the news 
increases. We also find some evidence consistent with the strategic trading and the trade-off 
between incentives to capitalize on the foreknowledge and the disincentives created by the 
risk of regulatory scrutiny and lost reputation. When we control for equity based 
compensation and firm level governance characteristics, we find that the coefficient of CAR
2 
News is negative and significant suggesting that when the market reaction to the news release 
is very large, the potential risks of regulatory scrutiny increase and the insiders’ propensity to 
trade on the information starts to level off. These results imply a turning point to be 54.5%, 
which is in the tail of the distributions of CAR, and suggests that in the range of CAR we 
observe, the amount of buying ahead of good news increases with the price significance of the 
news, but it does so in a non-linear fashion. The link between trading and the information 
content of the news weakens as the information content increases. The finding is similar to the 
result in Piotroski and Roulstone (2008) who also find that the turning point of insiders’ 
propensity to trade is in the extreme upper tail of the distribution of earnings news they 
analyze. In the next two regression specifications, we divide the news into news associated 
with explicitly defined trading ban periods (Banned) and news without the ban periods (Not 
Banned). As expected, we find that insiders are likely to adopt the strategic trading behavior 
only in the Not Banned category where the decision to trade depends more on their 
interpretation of the news which is not explicitly regulated by the Model Code of the London 
Stock Exchange presented in Section 2.   26
[Table 3 about here] 
The remaining results indicate that firm size and market-to-book do not affect insiders’ 
buy trades decision. The corporate governance factors appear to have also a marginal effect 
on the decision, suggesting that insider trading is independent of the board characteristics. In 
particular, we find that equity based compensation and board composition are not related to 
the magnitude of buying ahead of good news announcements. The results indicate that only 
board size affects positively insiders’ decision to buy. Instead, the results show that the 
coefficient of past returns is negative and significant, suggesting that insiders buy mainly in 
firms with negative past returns, and that they adopt contrarian strategies. Brennan and Cao 
(1996) suggest that contrarian investors are likely to be informed. Our results provide further 
evidence supporting the information content of the trading by insiders. 
The findings on the determinants of the amount of net selling before bad news releases 
do not reveal any strongly significant link between net selling and the market impact of the 
forthcoming disclosure. The coefficient of |CAR| is negative but insignificant, while the 
coefficient of CAR
2 is positive and significant at the 0.1 significance level. These results 
provide some weak evidence that there is more insider trading before more significant bad 
news. When we split our sample into Banned and Not Banned news, we find significant 
relationship between trading and the importnace of the news in the Banned category. 
However, due to the very small number of observations with trading in that group, the results 
are not meaningful. The relationship in the Not Banned category is weaker compared to the 
full sample. The result can corroborate arguments in the insider trading literature that insider 
selling is largely motivated by liquidity and portfolio diversification reasons and less driven 
by private information, in line with a number of event study findings of no or little stock price 
changes following insider sales (see, e.g. Ravina and Sapienza, 2009; and Fidrmuc at al., 
2006, for the latest evidence from the U.S. and U.K., respectively). Our results, however, do   27
not preclude the explanation that insiders strategically choose to refrain from trading before 
bad news to avoid the risk of regulatory scrutiny. 
The remaining results indicate also that insiders’ sell trades are not related to their 
firm’s market-to-book. The impact of firm’s governance structure is also relatively weak. 
However, in contrast to the buy trades, our results indicate that insiders sell in large firms, but 
they do not adopt contrarian strategies, as the coefficient of past returns is positive and not 
significant. Overall, our results indicate that the characteristics of firms in which they buy 
before good news are different from those in which they sell before bad news announcements. 
However, the low R-square of our regressions suggests that these characteristics explain only 
a very small proportion of the trading behavior of insiders in our sample. 
We expand further this analysis by reporting in Table 3, Panel B, the logit results to 
analyze the occurrence of insider trading. We test whether insiders are net buyers before good 
news and net sellers before bad news.
14 In the sample of good news we find that the decision 
whether or not to buy before the favorable disclosure, unlike the decision how much to buy 
analyzed in Panel A of Table 3, does not depend on the expected market impact of the 
forthcoming disclosure. The coefficients of |CAR| and CAR
2 are not significantly different 
from zero. The significant coefficients in the Banned group have little meaning as there are 
very few observations with insider trading in that category. On the other hand, there is a 
strong link between the probability of selling and the information content of the forthcoming 
announcement in the sample of bad news. The results of the multivariate regressions confirm 
the findings at the univariate level presented in Section 5.1. We find that insiders are less 
likely to trade ahead of the bad news when the news is important, as reflected in the negative 
and significant coefficient of |CAR|. However, the coefficient of CAR
2 is significant and 
positive which indicates that the disincentive starts to diminish with the importance of the 
                                                 
14 Note that throughout the paper the number of observation reported for logit regressions is lower than for the 
OLS model. This is because in the estimation of fixed effect logit, firms with all positive or all negative 
outcomes are dropped.   28
news. Still, the minimum of the estimated logit function with respect to |CAR| in the model 
without compensation and governance control variables is found to be at |CAR| = 84.5%, 
which indicates that indeed we are looking at the decreasing part of the curve and the 
disincentives would die out in the extreme beyond the range of |CAR| we observe. In line with 
the results in Panel A, we find that the likelihood of selling ahead of news is larger in larger 
firms. The coefficient of Past Return is negative and significant for the buy trades ahead of 
good news, and positive and significant for the sell trades ahead of bad news, which provides 
further evidence on the contrarian strategies adopted by insiders. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 suggest the following patterns in insider 
trading decisions. First, in the case of good forthcoming news, we find some evidence that 
insiders strategically choose the amount of shares bought, increasing their purchases as the 
price impact of the news goes up but limiting the amount of shares purchased as the news 
becomes extreme. We argue that the decision is driven by the trade-off between the incentives 
to capitalize on the information content of the disclosure and the potential costs of regulatory 
scrutiny and lost reputation. We also find that it is the magnitude rather than incidence of 
trading that is strategically chosen. On the other hand, the incentives and disincentives to sell 
before bad news are different. We uncover that insiders strategically choose whether to sell 
rather than how much to sell. The probability of insider selling significantly decreases with 
the importance of the forthcoming news. We conjecture that insiders’ decisions are strongly 
affected by the risk of a regulatory action against them when they sell on private information 
and hence they want to avoid any suspicion and decide not to trade at all. Therefore, the 
decision to trade or not to trade rather than the choice of the amount traded is of primary 
importance. 
We shed more light on the strategic insider trading in Table 4 where we analyze 
trading around specific news categories. The table allows us to investigate whether the   29
behavior depends on the news type, and which news categories drive our results on more 
aggregate level presented in Table 3. Panel A of Table 4 presents coefficients of the OLS 
regressions with the magnitude of net buying and net selling as the dependent variable in the 
good news and bad news sample, respectively. We find that the non-linear relation between 
the amount traded and CAR in the sample of good news documented in Table 3 is mainly 
driven by releases of news on Other Results and Dividends, Restructuring news and General 
Business Info, for which the coefficient of |CAR| is positive and the coefficient of CAR
2 is 
negative. As reported in Table 2, these three groups of good news are, on average, most price-
sensitive. Considering that they are therefore most likely to attract regulatory scrutiny and 
investor attention, one would expect insiders to trade strategically before these news 
announcements and carefully consider their trading decisions. The results also indicate a 
decrease in insider buying ahead of Capital Structure news announcements, but at a 
diminishing rate, as the significance of the news increases. The results across other news 
categories are mixed. In the sample of bad news, the link between net selling and the 
information content of the disclosure is weak. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The results of the logit analysis focused on the probability of trading across different 
news categories are reported in Panel B of Table 4. The signs of the estimated coefficients of 
|CAR| and CAR
2 differ across news categories in the sample of good news, possibly leading to 
insignificant relationship between the probability of insider trading and CAR reported in Table 
3. Looking at the coefficients that are significant at least at the 0.05 level, we find that the 
probability of trading increases in a non-linear fashion with the importance of news in the 
Ownership category, but decreases, also non-linearly, for Other Results and Dividends. For 
Capital Structure news, the probability of buying increases linearly, and for Restructuring 
news it decreases linearly with the information content of the forthcoming news. In the bad   30
news sample we find a strong negative and non-linear relation between CAR and the 
propensity to sell for Other Results and Dividends news and for General Business Info. As 
presented in Table 2, Other Results and Dividends and General Business Info are highly 
price-sensitive disclosures, second only to Earnings announcements associated with explicit 
trading bans. Since it is generally accepted that such announcements attract attention of 
regulators, as well as media interest, the probability of being accused of insider trading is 
high. Therefore, the result reinforces our earlier arguments and provides further support that 
the regulatory and legal risks have significant impact on the trading behavior. 
The major assumptions of our tests that underlie the interpretations given above are 
that first, insiders have perfect foresight and can predict how the market will react when the 
information is publicly released, and second, that cumulative abnormal return measured over 
days 0 and +1 relative to the news announcement date is a true proxy of the information 
content of the announcement. This can create potential problems if CAR is contaminated by 
market reaction to insider trading and can lead to potential endogeneity and reversed causality 
concerns. For example, one may argue that the market reaction upon the news announcement 
may be influenced by insider trading in the preceding weeks. Nevertheless, previous studies 
provide conflicting empirical evidence on the direction in which this reversed causality 
works. On the one hand, it is possible that insider trades ahead of the announcement preempt 
some information content of the news, start moving prices in the direction of the expected 
innovation, and, as a consequence, reduce the information content of the news when it is 
finally released. The preemption comes from outsiders observing insiders’ actions and trading 
in the same direction or insiders ‘mechanically’ pushing prices when trading heavily. In either 
case, insider trading ahead of the announcement leads to a weaker or no market reaction on 
the news announcement. Evidence consistent with this argument is provided by Damodaran 
and Liu (1993) in a sample of real estate investment trust reappraisals and Udpa (1996) and   31
Roulstone (2008) for earnings announcements. An alternative argument is that insider trading 
and news releases can be considered complementary signals and, additionally, insider trading 
(i.e., a change in insider holdings) adds credibility to the forthcoming disclosure. In that case, 
investors use information on trades preceding the news release to interpret the information 
content of the release itself and a stronger market reaction is observed around the 
announcement of news preceded by insider trading. Evidence consistent with this argument is 
provided, for example, by John and Lang (1991) and Gu and Li (2007). 
In light of the mixed previous evidence, the effect of the potential reversed causality 
on our results is unclear. We argue though that the potential impact of the reversed causality 
on our results is limited. As we show, generally, we find more insider trading ahead of more 
significant good news and less insider trading ahead of more significant bad news. Such 
asymmetry is difficult to reconcile consistently with the arguments of reversed causality 
presented above, but is in line with our arguments on incentives and disincentives to trade. 
Also, as it is documented in a range of event studies (e.g., Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Ravina and 
Sapienza, 2009), insider selling is generally not informative therefore it is difficult to argue 
that in our sample insider selling would preempt the information content of bad news. 
Roulstone (2008) provides a more thorough econometric analysis of the potential endogeneity 
between insider trading and market reaction to earnings announcements. However, we are 
unable to address the endogeneity issue in our empirical tests, as we cannot find appropriate 
and valid instruments for stock price reaction (CAR) in such a diverse and comprehensive set 
of corporate announcements. 
Still, we are aware that our results should be treated with some caution. In Section 6.3 
below we provide some robustness tests that shed more light on the impact of the choice of 
the window over which we measure CAR on our findings. 
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6.  Further Empirical Tests 
6.1.Regulatory Change and the Costs of Trading 
The legal costs and hence disincentives to trade on private information are difficult to 
measure. However, a change in insider trading regulations provides a natural experiment 
because it can be treated as an exogenous shock to the costs of trading. If the costs indeed 
play a role in the decision to trade or not to trade on the foreknowledge of a proximate 
disclosure, we should observe a change in managers’ trading decisions as a response to the 
regulatory change. The previous insider trading literature provides evidence that the stock 
trading behavior by U.S. managers changed around the enactment of the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (1988) and the Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act (1990). The objectives of the Acts were to enhance the deterrence 
measures against insider trading, improve detection and increasing penalties associated with 
insider trading. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) document that the amount of trading by 
managers after the enactment of the new laws has a weaker association with contemporaneous 
earnings innovations, and a stronger association with the following year’s earnings 
information. Garfinkel (1997) finds that, following the regulatory changes, insiders tend to 
postpone trading until after earnings disclosures. Taken together, the results of both studies 
can be interpreted as evidence that a change in the regulations potentially changes the 
perceived legal costs associated with trading on near-term news. 
As outlined in Section 2, our sample period covers a similar change to the regulatory 
regime in the U.K. The new regulations on market abuse, including insider trading, were 
introduced by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and apply to misconduct on or 
after December 1, 2001. The objectives of the new regulatory regime were similar to the 
developments in the U.S. in 1988 and 1990. The new regime was expected to provide a clear   33
statement of the standards for market participants, improve the enforcement of insider trading 
regulations and make the penalties more imminent even for less severe breaches of rules. 
Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), we use the change in the regulations to 
classify our observations into two enforcement regimes: low enforcement (before December 
1, 2001) and high enforcement (after December 1, 2001). We expect the new regulations to 
increase the risk of a regulatory action and a penalty for trading on private information. 
Consequently, we may observe a lower association between the amount of trading or the 
occurrence of trading and the market impact of the announcement, a decrease in trading ahead 
of news with very large market impact and/or overall less trading ahead of news disclosures. 
To test the impact of the new regulations we extend our basic regressions to allow the 
coefficients of |CAR| and CAR
2 to differ between the low and high enforcement periods. 
Specifically, we add to the regressions cross-products of |CAR| and CAR
2 with a dummy 
variable POST which is equal to one for news announcements released on or after December 
31, 2001, i.e. announcements for which we observe insider trading from December 1, 2001 
onwards (the date when new rules came in force). POST is equal to zero otherwise. 
Additionally we add POST to the regression to check for possible changes in the amount or 
probability of insider trading in the new regime. The results are reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
We find some statistically significant evidence of the impact of the regulatory change 
on the perceived costs of trading in the regressions explaining the amount of net buying in the 
good news sample reported in Panel A of Table 5. We find that the non-linear effect reflecting 
diminishing incentives to trade as the event becomes extreme is a result of the higher 
enforcement regime after December 2001. Before the change in regulations, insiders traded 
more on more significant news as reflected in the positive coefficient of |CAR| and 
insignificant coefficient of CAR
2. After the change in regulations, the incentives to trade on   34
less price-sensitive information increased (positive coefficient of |CAR| × POST), but the 
impact of disincentives became visible for more significant news (negative coefficient of 
CAR
2 × POST). As expected the results are driven by the group of news other than earnings 
releases which further supports the importance of an insider’s own interpretation of the signal 
and individual decision to trade or not. Insiders are explicitly banned from trading ahead of 
earnings announcements. There is some further evidence on the impact of new enforcement 
regime in the logit analysis in the bad news subsample presented in Panel B of Table 5. 
Generally, the probability of insider selling ahead of bad news decreases, but at a diminishing 
rate, as the significance of the news increases. The results taking into account the change in 
regulations reveal that in the stricter regime the reduction in the disincentives eased as 
reflected by the negative coefficient of CAR
2 × POST. The results on the impact of the change 
in regulations in other specifications are inconclusive. 
The results are subject to two caveats. First, the new regime came in force in 
December 2001, but the changes were announced and consulted earlier. Hence any changes to 
insider behavior could be gradual and we may not be able to detect them in our relatively 
short sample window of four years. Second, as documented by Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) the economic impact of insider trading regulations can only be observed around the 
first enforcement. As mentioned in Section 2, the FSA imposed the first civil penalty in the 
new regime only in February 2004. 
 
6.2.Trading by CEO and Chairmen and the Effect of Reputation 
All previous results are based on aggregated trading by all insiders in the firm that 
announces the news. In this section, we look at trading by selected individuals – CEOs and 
Chairmen. First, it allows us to investigate whether trading behavior differs depending on the 
position of the insider within the firm. Second, looking at individuals, we are able to control   35
for their characteristics that may shed more light on the factors behind trading decisions. As 
we outline in our hypothesis, the disincentives to trade include the risks of reputational and 
political costs. When looking at individuals, we are able to analyze two proxies for reputation 
– the number of boards given individual sits on and his/her age. If the risk of losing reputation 
indeed plays a role, we should see less insider trading by individuals sitting on many boards 
and by older individuals. The results are reported in Table 6. To save space, we report only 
regressions that separately include Banned and Not Banned news. The unreported results in 
the full sample are similar to the results for the Not Banned category. The full results are 
available upon request. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Altogether, we find some evidence of the reputation effects. We find that Chairmen 
withhold from selling ahead of bad news when they sit on more boards, as reflected in the 
strongly significant negative coefficient of # Boards in the logit results in Panel B. It is 
consistent with the larger jeopardy when trading on bad news compared to good news. We 
find also that CEOs sell more ahead of bad news when they get older. This is not consistent 
with the reputational argument but may rather reflect liquidity trading and cashing out by 
older executives. We also find some interesting results on the link between trading and CAR. 
CEOs are found to make informed trading decisions. The amount of buying ahead of good 
news confirms our hypothesis on the non-linearity. The amount of selling by CEOs is 
independent of CAR but the decision to sell analyzed in the logit regression is non-linear. 
Interestingly, the results are different from the results in the full sample. We find that CEOs 
sell more when the content of the news increases, but withhold from selling when the news 
becomes large. The turning point is |CAR|  = 12.3%. For Chairmen, generally, the link 
between insider trading and CAR is weaker than for supposedly better informed CEOs. We   36
find some evidence though on Chairmen’s strategic decision related to the amount of buying 
before good news announcement. 
To summarize, we find some evidence that the reputational risks play a role in the 
insider trading decisions by Chairmen. We also find strong evidence on strategic informed 
trading by CEOs, the individuals with the best information in the firm. These results are likely 
to be specific to the U.K. market as the roles of the CEO and the Chairman tend to be split 
following the various corporate governance codes recommendations, starting with Cadbury in 
1992. In addition, Chairmen in the U.K. are likely to be non-executive, and thus likely to have 
less information than CEOs. 
 
6.3.Preemption of the Information Content of News 
In the main body of the paper we use cumulative abnormal return measured over days 
0 and +1 relative to the news announcement date as our proxy for the information content of 
the news disclosure. We want the window to be narrow enough not to capture anything that 
may be happening further away from the announcement, which may move prices. We 
acknowledge however that this short-window measure may not be precise. First, there may be 
leakage ahead of the announcements moving prices before day 0. Second, insider trades ahead 
of the announcement may preempt some information content of the news, as discussed in 
Section 5.2. As a robustness check we re-run our main regressions keeping the left-hand side 
variable unchanged (as insider trading in the 30 calendar days before the announcement) and 
changing the window over which we measure our right-hand side CAR. Because, by 
construction, abnormal returns can only be calculated for trading days, we look at CAR 
measured over the windows [-20,+1], [-10,+1], and [-5,+1] trading days relative to the 
announcement day. The window going back 20 trading days is approximately equivalent to 
the 30-calendar day window.   37
The results are presented in Table 7. For space considerations we report only the 
coefficients of our main variables of interest (|CAR| and CAR
2) and only for regressions that 
separately include Banned and Not Banned news. Full results are available upon request. 
Overall, we find that the relationship between the amount of buying and CAR for good news 
(OLS model) measured over the different windows increases and becomes statistically 
significant as the observation window shortens converging to our findings on the window 
[0,+1]. We confirm that insiders trade more ahead of the news as the information content of 
the news increases. We do not find the non-linear effect though. The logit regressions for 
good news provide evidence that the coefficients of CAR in the Not Banned group measured 
in longer windows confirm our hypothesis and are in line with the findings from the OLS 
model. We find some evidence on the non-linear link, in line with the cost-benefit trade-off 
argument, in the window [-5,+1]. In longer windows, we find that, generally, the probability 
of buying increases, but linearly, as the significance of the forthcoming news goes up. The 
coefficients of the OLS model for bad news are significant only in the Banned group. 
However, the small number of observations with trading in that group does not allow drawing 
meaningful conclusions. This is in line with the main results reported in Table 3. In the logit 
regressions for bad news with CAR measured over the [-20,+1] window, we find evidence 
consistent with our hypothesis for news in the Not Banned group, in which insiders have 
discretion on whether to trade or not. The probability of selling increases, but at the 
diminishing rate, as the news becomes more significant. Again, the statistically significant 
results for the Banned news have to be interpreted with caution. 
 [Table 7 about here] 
To summarize, if we allow for potential information leakage and news preemption in 
the definition of the window over which we measure the market reaction to news 
announcements, our main findings hold. We find that the amount and probability of insider   38
buying ahead of good news increases, with some evidence of the non-linear increase, as the 
information content of the news increases. This reflects the increasing incentives to trade 
profitably, as well as the disincentive effect of regulations when the news becomes extreme. 
For insider selling before bad news announcements, we find that, if anything, insiders 
strategically make a decision on whether to trade rather than on how much to trade and avoid 
trading on price-sensitive information. This is consistent with the larger regulatory and 
reputation risks associated with trading on negative information. The weaker results for bad 
news can also indicate that managers try to distance themselves from unfavorable disclosures. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the strategic trading of insiders and the ways insiders use 
short-lived private information. We argue that the decisions to trade or not to trade on the 
foreknowledge of corporate news in short windows before news announcements is likely to 
be taken strategically and will result from a trade-off between the incentives to capitalize on 
foreknowledge of the information content of the disclosure and the disincentives created by 
the risk of the regulatory scrutiny and political and reputation costs. We assume that insiders 
know the information content of the upcoming disclosure and can predict how the market will 
react when the disclosure is made. The more relevant is the information released to the 
market, the larger is the profit that insiders can make by trading on this information. However, 
the jeopardy of a potential regulatory action and the costs of a reputation loss are expected to 
be higher if the forthcoming news release is highly price-sensitive and, consequently, this 
may prevent insiders from trading. 
We investigate insider trading around the universe of regulatory news announcements 
in U.K. listed companies included in the FTSE All Share Index between January 1999 and 
December 2002. Overall, our results show that insiders strategically time their trading before   39
news announcement, and we argue that the trading decisions are primarily driven by 
regulations and potential risks of lost reputation. We find that a larger fraction of good news, 
compared to bad news, is preceded by insider trading, and that the regulatory trading bans are 
well enforced and insiders do not trade before earnings announcements. We show that 
insiders strategically choose the amount of shares bought ahead of good news 
announcements, increasing their purchases as the price impact of the news goes up, but the 
amount of shares purchased levels off as the news becomes extreme. In the case of bad news, 
we find that insiders strategically choose whether to sell rather than how much to sell and the 
probability of insider selling significantly decreases with the importance of the forthcoming 
news. We argue that when facing a risk of potential legal action, insiders’ primary decision is 
on whether to trade or not, rather than on the magnitude of trading. To avoid the risk, insiders 
decide to fully withhold from trading. For both good and bad news, we find that the results on 
strategic trading are driven by news in, on average, the most price-sensitive categories of 
announcements, further supporting the argument that the regulatory and reputational risks 
have a significant impact on insider trading behavior. We also find evidence on clearly 
pronounced strategic informed trading by CEOs, we show that insider trading patterns change 
when the regulatory regime becomes stricter, and that insiders with higher reputation at risk 
limit their trading ahead of bad news. All these findings support our arguments on incentives 
and disincentives that drive insider trading decision shortly before news announcement. 
There are certain limitations of our approach and inherent problems in insider trading 
research in general. Private information by its nature is not observable and we can only use 
imperfect proxies for the existence and significance of the information. We use the universe 
of corporate announcements and assume that insiders know the information ahead of the 
market. On the one hand, we look at a set of firm-specific news coming from within the 
company that potentially constitute private information known to insiders. However, in some   40
cases the information may be known only to a fraction of corporate insiders or is not known 
to them in advance at all, such as sudden events outside the firm’s control that trigger ad hoc 
disclosures. Hence, we may be assuming existence of private information while the insiders in 
fact do not have it. As a consequence, we cannot rule out the possibility that in some cases 
when we observe no trading, the insiders do not withhold from trading on the basis of the 
significance of private information but simply because they do not have the information. 
Furthermore, we look at 30 days rather than a longer time span before the news 
announcement. We provide evidence on the timing of trading before news releases to support 
the rationale for our approach, and we also argue that the information advantage associated 
with many corporate events is short-lived as the news in many cases become public shortly 
after the firm’s insiders know them. Therefore, insiders have a short window of opportunity to 
trade with the foreknowledge. However, for some specific types of significant information it 
may also be possible that insiders know the information much in advance and trade as early as 
many quarters ahead of the announcement (see, e.g., Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; Ke et al., 
2003). Hence, we may be observing no trading in the 30-day window and classify the event as 
no-trade while in fact it is preceded by trading much earlier. Moreover, we may be missing 
periods in which insiders are informed and have private information in relation to the 
company, but it is not associated with a news disclosure forthcoming in the next 30 days. For 
example, there may be private information originating outside the company, such as a 
significant announcement by another company in the sector, an industry-wide event, or an 
event or announcement related to the company but coming from outside the firm (e.g., an 
analyst report or a press report) which we do not cover in our dataset. This could be addressed 
in an analysis of events defined as stock price movements above a certain threshold rather 
than news releases (see, e.g. Ravina and Sapienza, 2009). We do not follow that path though 
because we believe that our approach is more precise in identifying specific pieces of news   41
and we limit the risk of including cases of random large price changes not related to any 
information. Finally, the underlying assumption of our tests is that insiders have perfect 
foresight and can predict how the market will react when the information is publicly released. 
This can create potential endogeneity and reversed causality concerns as one may argue that 
the market reaction upon the news announcement may be influenced (positively or 
negatively) by insider trading in the preceding weeks. We address these issues in the 
discussion and interpretation of our empirical results and provide some evidence to show the 
robustness of our findings. Nevertheless, we are aware that our findings should be interpreted 
with some caution. 
Future research could follow several avenues. First, one could explore in detail when 
insiders trade ahead of announcements, whether the trades tend to cluster at a certain time 
before the news, and whether the timing of the trades changes across news with different 
market impact and across types of news. We provide some preliminary evidence in Figure 1 
but a more detailed study of the patterns would be warranted. Second, one could investigate 
the intra-group dynamics and herding among insiders. It remains open whether individual 
insiders follow with trading if they learn about trading by their colleagues, or, on the contrary, 
decide not to trade if their colleagues trade not to attract too much attention. Third, one could 
explore the strategic timing of insider trading together with the strategic timing of news 
disclosure. We treat the timing of news announcements as exogenous and we analyze whether 
insiders strategically trade before the announcements, but it is worth investigating whether or 
not insiders strategically manipulate both trading and news releases. Finally, we focus on only 
direct trading in equity. We do not consider trading by insiders in the options and derivatives 
market. The extent to which all these factors will strengthen or alter our conclusions is a 
matter of further research.   42
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Appendix A. News Classification 
News Category  News Items 
Earnings  Preliminary Annual Results 
Interim Results 
Quarterly Results 




Capital Structure  Equity Issue 
Debt Issue 
Transactions in Own Shares 
Blocklisting Interim Review 
Script Dividends 
Debt 
Other Capital Structure 
Restructuring  Mergers and Acquisitions 
Demergers 
Expansion of Business 
Disposals 
Interest in Shares 
Ownership  Ownership Changes 
Board Changes  Board Changes 
Management Appointments 
General Business Info  Change of Adviser 
Agreements 
Awards and Cancellations of Contracts 




Net Asset Value 
Litigation Issues 
Labour Issues 
Other Business Information 
Miscellaneous  Other Appointments 
Listing 
Other 
Observations without a Title 
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Appendix B. Definitions of the Variables 
Variable  Definition 
Net Buying 
(Net Selling) 
Number of shares bought less the number of shares sold (the number of shares 
sold less the number of share bought) by insiders over 30 days before the news 
announcement, scaled by the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by 100. 
CAR News  Cumulative abnormal return over days 0 and +1 relative to the news 
announcement. Abnormal returns are market model adjusted. Coefficients of 
the market model are estimated over 260 trading days ending 31 calendar days 
before the news announcement. 
|CAR| News  Absolute value of CAR News. 
|CAR| Banned 
(|CAR| Not Banned)  
Event period cumulative abnormal return of the news in the group of Banned 
(Not Banned) news. 
Past Return  Return on the stock measured over 120 trading days ending 31 calendar days 
before the news announcement. 
Size  Firm’s market capitalization in GBP million measured on the day of the news 
announcement. 
LnSize   Natural logarithm of Size. 
Market-to-Book  Ratio of the market value of shares and book value of shares on the day of the 
news announcement. 
Grants  Sum of volumes of: options, long-term investment plan options (exercisable 
and nonexercisable) and long-term investment plan shares granted in the 
financial year in which the news was announced, scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
LnGrants  Natural logarithm of 1+Grants. 
Board 
Independence 
Dummy variable taking value of one if the proportion of non-executive 
directors to the total number of board members is greater or equal to 50% in 
the financial year in which the news was announced. Equal to zero otherwise. 
CEO/Chairman 
Duality 
Dummy variable taking value of one if the same person acts as both CEO and 
Chairman in the financial year in which the news was announced. Equal to 
zero otherwise. 
Board Size  Total number of board members including executive and non-executive 
directors in the financial year in which the news was announced. 
LnBoard Size  Natural logarithm of Board Size. 
POST   Dummy variable equal to one for news observations in the stronger insider 
trading regulatory regime introduced in December 2001, and zero otherwise. 
# Boards  Number of boards of listed companies the insider sits on in the financial year 
in which the news was announced 
Age  Insider’s age in the financial year in which the news was announced.   48 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of News Announcements 





N Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev.  N Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev.   N  Mean  Median Std. 
Dev.   Mean  Median 
Panel A. Good News                                  
   CAR News  39,617 0.037
  0.018
  0.060   4,083 0.035
  0.019  0.051  35,534  0.037 0.018 0.060   0.011 0.164 
   Past Return  39,617  0.028
  -0.020
  0.578   4,083  -0.057  -0.079  0.465  35,534  0.038 -0.012 0.589   0.000  0.000 
   Size  39,617  3,381  224
  14,122   4,083  5,606  409  20,517   35,534  3,126 211 13,166  0.000  0.000 
   Market-to-Book  39,617  3.170
  1.880
   16.535   4,083 1.282  1.690 18.305   35,534 3.387 1.910  16.306   0.000  0.000 
   Net Buying  39,617  -0.111  0.000  0.778    4,083  0.118  0.007  0.627    35,534  -0.017  0.000  0.355       
Grants×100 27,735  0.316  0.096  0.818    3,375  0.271  0.104  0.493    24,360  0.322  0.094  0.853    0.000  0.000 
Board Independence  27,735  0.656  1.000  0.475    3,375  0.670  1.000  0.470    24,360  0.654  1.000  0.476    0.073  0.076 
CEO/Chairman Duality 27,735 0.267  0.000 0.442   3,375 0.254  0.000  0.435  24,360  0.269 0.000 0.443   0.063  0.066 
Board Size  27,735  8.710  8.000  2.869    3,375  9.331  8.000  2.837    24,360  8.624  8.000  2.863    0.000  0.000 
Panel B. Bad News                                  
   CAR News  38,634  -0.036 -0.016  0.075    1,262  -0.025 -0.014  0.039  37,372  -0.036 -0.017  0.076   0.000 0.000 
   Past Return  38,634  0.114 0.030  0.705   1,262  0.338 0.164 0.747  37,372  0.106 0.025 0.702   0.000 0.000 
   Size  38,634  3,487 261  14,495    1,262  7,246 545 22,651   37,372  3,361 254  14,121   0.000 0.000 
   Market-to-Book  38,634  3.630 2.040  14.292   1,262  6.104 3.120  15.802  37,372  3.546 2.000  14.231   0.000 0.000 
   Net Selling  38,634  0.010 0.000  0.367   1,262  0.533 0.017 1.732  37,372  -0.008 0.000 0.167     
Grants×100  27,459  0.319 0.095  1.059   1,050  0.259 0.075 0.703  26,409  0.322 0.095 1.071   0.006 0.001 
Board Independence  27,459  0.649 1.000  0.477   1,050  0.515 1.000 0.500  26,409  0.654 1.000 0.476   0.000 0.000 
CEO/Chairman Duality  27,459  0.264 0.000  0.441   1,050  0.238 0.000 0.426  26,409  0.265 0.000 0.441   0.055 0.055 
Board Size  27,459  8.742 8.000  2.857   1,050  9.810 9.000 3.506  26,409  8.700 8.000 2.820   0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of news announcements in the samples of Good News and Bad News. Good News (Bad News) is an announcement that yields 
non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News (Bad News), an announcement is associated with insider trading if there is a positive net amount of shares 
bought (sold) within 30 calendar days before the announcement (News Preceded by Insider Trading). Differences between News Preceded by Insider Trading and News 
without Insider Trading are presented using T-test for differences in means and Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test for differences in medians. The sample includes all regulatory 
news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the Regulatory News Service (RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. See, Appendix B for detailed 
definitions of the variables.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of CAR News [0,+1] across News Categories 





 N  Mean  Median Std. 
Dev.   N  %  of  All Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev.   N  Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev.   Mean  Median 
Panel A. Good News                              
 All  39,617  0.037  0.018  0.060    4,083 10.31  0.035  0.019  0.051
   35,534  0.037
  0.018 0.060    0.011  0.164 
 Earnings  1,733  0.059  0.037  0.069    39 2.25  0.052  0.032  0.057    1,694  0.059  0.037  0.069    0.526  0.649 
 Other Results and Div 4,590  0.050  0.029  0.063    348 7.58  0.041  0.024  0.062    4,242  0.050  0.030  0.063    0.006  0.000 
 Capital Structure  4,593  0.029  0.016  0.049    720 15.68  0.029  0.016  0.041    3,873  0.029  0.016  0.050    0.849  0.226 
 Restructuring  7,552  0.036  0.017  0.061    589 7.80  0.035  0.021  0.054    6,963  0.036  0.017  0.061    0.821  0.009 
 Ownership  9,949  0.032  0.016  0.048    1,268 12.74  0.035  0.018  0.050    8,681  0.031  0.016  0.048    0.026  0.001 
 Board Changes  1,906  0.033  0.016  0.048    218 11.12  0.031  0.016  0.041    1,688  0.033  0.016  0.049    0.507  0.968 
 General Business Info 4,369  0.052  0.029  0.076    492 11.26  0.045  0.026  0.064    3,877  0.053  0.029  0.077    0.017  0.022 
 Miscellaneous  11,893  0.035  0.016  0.067    922 7.75  0.035
  0.020 0.054    10,971  0.035  0.016  0.068    0.712  0.001 
Panel B. Bad News                               
 All  38,634  -0.036  -0.016  0.075    1,262 3.27  -0.025  -0.014  0.093    37,372  -0.036  -0.017  0.076    0.000  0.000 
 Earnings  1,707  -0.076  -0.043  0.112    3 0.18  -0.011  -0.013  0.004    1,704  -0.076  -0.043  0.112    0.000  0.059 
 Other Results and Div 4,339  -0.073  -0.030  0.130    113 2.60  -0.026  -0.014  0.044    4,226  -0.074  -0.031  0.131    0.000  0.000 
 Capital Structure  4,724  -0.027  -0.015  0.051    185 3.92  -0.026  -0.015  0.035    4,539  -0.027  -0.015  0.052    0.883  0.958 
 Restructuring  7,318  -0.031  -0.014  0.073    198 2.71  -0.023  -0.014  0.023    7,120  -0.031  -0.014  0.074    0.000  0.730 
 Ownership  10,189  -0.025  -0.014  0.040    415 4.07  -0.021  -0.012  0.028    9,774  -0.026  -0.014  0.041    0.005  0.011 
 Board Changes  1,763  -0.035  -0.016  0.069    63 3.57  -0.021  -0.015  0.022    1,700  -0.035  -0.016  0.070    0.000  0.422 
 General Business Info 3,316  -0.047  -0.023  0.102    102 3.08  -0.040  -0.021  0.080    3,214  -0.047  -0.023  0.102    0.387  0.635 
 Miscellaneous  12,112  -0.033  -0.015  0.076    357 2.95  -0.028  -0.015  0.034    11,755  -0.033  -0.015  0.077    0.003  0.542 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of CAR News in the samples of Good News and Bad News. Good News (Bad News) is an announcement that yields non-
negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News (Bad News), an announcement is associated with insider trading if there is a positive net amount of shares bought 
(sold) within 30 calendar days before the announcement (News Preceded by Insider Trading). The number of observations in the All category is not equal to the sum of 
observation in individual categories because in the All category multiple announcements made by a firm on the same day are treated as one observation to avoid multiple 
counting of CARs. Differences between News Preceded by Insider Trading and News without Insider Trading are presented using T-test for differences in means and 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test for differences in medians. The sample includes all regulatory news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the Regulatory News 
Service (RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. See, Appendix A for a list of examples of news items included in each specific category.   50 
Table 3. Determinants of Insider Trading around News Announcements 
  Panel A. 
OLS with Firm FE: 
the amount of net buying before good news (net selling before bad news) 
Panel B. 
Logit with Firm FE: 
probability of positive net buying before good news (net selling before bad news) 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
Constant 0.043  -0.043  0.043  -0.044  -0.080
b -0.043  -0.080
b  -0.042             
 (0.356)  (0.606)  (0.356)  (0.600)  (0.024)  (0.458)  (0.025)  (0.465)             









 (0.255)  (0.396)  (0.255)  (0.394)  (0.013)  (0.000) (0.013)  (0.000) (0.119) (0.106) (0.137) (0.125) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 -0.001  -0.000 0.002 0.004  0.002  0.004 
 (0.559)  (0.897)  (0.558)  (0.898)  (0.564)  (0.483) (0.563)  (0.484) (0.690) (0.640) (0.722) (0.659) (0.541)  (0.449)  (0.587)  (0.511) 













 (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.128)  (0.105) (0.129)  (0.105) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
LnGrants   -0.137    -0.142    0.082    0.092   -6.916   -7.074    -21.217    -21.288 
   (0.718)    (0.710)    (0.820)    (0.800)   (0.430)    (0.418)   (0.213)   (0.209) 
Board Independence   0.007    0.008    -0.009   -0.009    0.063    0.071    -0.191    -0.207 
   (0.294)    (0.282)    (0.237)    (0.240)   (0.711)    (0.681)   (0.398)    (0.366) 
CEO/Chairman     0.006    0.006    -0.007   -0.007    0.056    0.067    -0.470    -0.469 
Duality   (0.168)    (0.164)    (0.272)    (0.276)   (0.748)    (0.704)   (0.189)    (0.196) 
LnBoard Size    0.045
c   0.045
c   -0.054
c   -0.054
c   0.670
c   0.692
c  0.643    0.624 
   (0.054)    (0.051)    (0.091)    (0.092)   (0.082)   (0.074)   (0.374)    (0.396) 
|CAR| News  0.214
a 0.366
a     -0.044  -0.048      -0.095  -0.485      -5.490
a -4.941
a    
 (0.002)  (0.005)      (0.204)  (0.424)      (0.882) (0.518)      (0.000) (0.001)    
CAR
2 News 0.025  -0.336
c     0.038
c 0.107
c     -0.185  0.228      3.248
a 4.260
a    
 (0.828)  (0.063)      (0.069)  (0.063)      (0.864) (0.896)      (0.000) (0.000)    
|CAR| Banned      -0.027  -0.031      -0.098
b -0.058      -26.909
a -29.737
a    -166.838
a -166.929
a 
     (0.735)  (0.836)      (0.020)  (0.390)     (0.000) (0.000)     (0.002)  (0.007) 
CAR
2 Banned      0.086  -0.266      0.142
a 0.075      29.505
a 65.047
a    98.028
a 96.593
b 
     (0.663)  (0.590)      (0.002)  (0.330)     (0.000) (0.000)     (0.003)  (0.011) 
|CAR| Not Banned       0.200
a 0.375
a     -0.043  -0.052     0.926  0.704     -4.313
a -3.862
b 
     (0.001)  (0.004)      (0.206)  (0.419)     (0.154) (0.363)     (0.001)  (0.017) 
CAR
2 Not Banned      0.023  -0.331
c     0.034
c 0.101      -1.471  -1.381      2.650
a 3.931
b 
     (0.842)  (0.061)     (0.094) (0.140)     (0.233) (0.459)     (0.000)  (0.041) 
N 39,617  27,735  39,617  27,735  38,634  27,459 38,634  27,459  30,966 24,081  30,966 24,081 17,519  14,113  17,519  14,113 
R
2/ Pseudo R
2  0.001 0.002  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.008  0.012 0.014  0.018 0.038 0.037  0.050  0.048 
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Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of the OLS and logit regressions with firm fixed effects (Firm FE) to explain insider stock buying (selling) within 30 calendar 
days before Good News (Bad News). Good News (Bad News) is an announcement that yields non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News (Bad News) 
announcements the dependent variable in the OLS regressions is defined as net buying (net selling) and is calculated as the number of shares bought (sold) less the number of 
shares sold (bought) by insiders over 30 days before the news announcement, scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 100. In the logit regressions the 
dependent variable equals one for news preceded by positive net buying (net selling) and zero otherwise. Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. Additional regression diagnostics F-test and Wald Chi
2 are reported for OLS and logit regressions, 
respectively. 
a, b, c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. The sample includes all regulatory news announcements by U.K. listed companies published 
in the Regulatory News Service (RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. See, Appendix B for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Insider Trading around Different Categories of News 
Announcements 
 Panel  A. 
OLS with Firm FE: 
the amount of net buying before good 
news (net selling before bad news) 
Panel B. 
Logit with Firm FE: probability of 
positive net buying before good news 
(net selling before bad news) 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
Constant 0.048  -0.083
b    
 (0.292)  (0.022)     
LnSize -0.010  0.016
b -0.119  0.918
a 
 (0.212)  (0.012)  (0.145)  (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  0.002 
 (0.588)  (0.565)  (0.725)  (0.621) 




 (0.002)  (0.139)  (0.001)  (0.049) 




 (0.546)  (0.068)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
CAR
2 Earnings  0.114  0.237
c 25.766
a 55.878 
 (0.565)  (0.073)  (0.000)  (0.216) 
|CAR| Other Results and Div  0.268
b -0.053  -6.604
a -9.000
a 
 (0.014)  (0.302)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
CAR
2 Other Results and Div  -0.574
a 0.031  11.868
a 7.353
b 
 (0.009)  (0.425)  (0.000)  (0.017) 
|CAR| Capital Structure  -0.189
b 0.380  6.118
a -1.972 
 (0.016)  (0.199)  (0.002)  (0.653) 
CAR
2 Capital Structure  1.175
a -0.351  -7.544  38.720 
 (0.000)  (0.243)  (0.331)  (0.207) 
|CAR| Restructuring  0.339
b -0.042  -3.001
b 1.003 
 (0.022)  (0.258)  (0.031)  (0.888) 
CAR
2 Restructuring  -0.558
a 0.016  4.346  -83.434
c 
 (0.001)  (0.506)  (0.215)  (0.086) 
|CAR| Ownership  0.255
c -0.059  5.369
a 2.419 
 (0.077)  (0.534)  (0.000)  (0.466) 
CAR
2 Ownership  0.075  0.080  -7.416
b -21.319 
 (0.683)  (0.447)  (0.046)  (0.378) 
|CAR| Board Changes  -0.096  0.011  1.482  9.355 
 (0.713)  (0.912)  (0.564)  (0.367) 
CAR
2 Board Changes  0.008  -0.001  -15.360  -174.520 
 (0.993)  (0.989)  (0.165)  (0.245) 
|CAR| General Business Info  0.134
c -0.098  1.043  -5.059
c 
 (0.070)  (0.106)  (0.365)  (0.097) 
CAR
2 General Business Info  -0.303
c 0.083
c -1.212  6.939
b 
 (0.051)  (0.089)  (0.589)  (0.015) 
|CAR| Miscellaneous  0.141  0.035  -1.477  0.015 
 (0.214)  (0.462)  (0.234)  (0.997) 
CAR
2 Miscellaneous  0.014  -0.010  -0.166  -8.155 
 (0.859)  (0.719)  (0.962)  (0.673) 
N 39,617  38,634  30,966  17,519 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.001  0.004  0.019  0.054 






Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of the OLS and logit regressions with firm fixed effects (Firm 
FE) to explain insider stock buying (selling) within 30 calendar days before Good News (Bad News) across 
different categories of the news (Earnings, Other Results and Dividends, Capital Structure, Restructuring,   53
Ownership, Board Changes, General Business Information and Miscellaneous). Good News (Bad News) is an 
announcement that yields non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News ( Bad News) 
announcements the dependent variable in the OLS regressions is defined as net buying (net selling) and is 
calculated as the number of shares bought (sold) less the number of shares sold (bought) by insiders over 30 days 
before the news announcement, scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 100. In the logit 
regressions the dependent variable equals one for news preceded by positive net buying (net selling) and zero 
otherwise. |CAR| Earnings (|CAR| Other Results and Div, |CAR| Capital Structure, |CAR| Restructuring, |CAR| 
Ownership, |CAR| Board Changes, |CAR| General Business Info, |CAR| Miscellaneous) is the absolute value of 
cumulative abnormal return over days 0 and +1 relative to the news announcement in a group of Earnings (Other 
Results and Div, Capital Structure, Restructuring, Ownership, Board Changes, General Business Info, and 
Miscellaneous). Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values of the 
coefficients are reported in parentheses. Additional regression diagnostics F-test and Wald Chi
2 are reported for 
OLS and logit regressions, respectively. 
a, b, c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. The 
sample includes news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. See, Appendix A for a list of examples of news items 
included in each specific category and Appendix B for definitions of the variables.   54
Table 5. The Effect of New Regulations on the Determinants of Insider Trading 
  Panel A. 
OLS with Firm FE: 
the amount of net buying before good 
news (net selling before bad news) 
Panel B. 
Logit with Firm FE: 
probability of positive net buying before good 
news (net selling before bad news) 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
Constant 0.030  0.029  -0.087
b -0.087
b        
 (0.526)  (0.533)  (0.040)  (0.041)         
LnSize -0.007  -0.007  0.016
b 0.016
b -0.124  -0.116  0.908
a 0.918
a 
 (0.414)  (0.421)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.130) (0.160)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.002 
 (0.575)  (0.578)  (0.564)  (0.563)  (0.703) (0.737)  (0.555)  (0.606) 
Past Return  -0.016
a -0.016





 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.125)  (0.127)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.036)  (0.046) 
POST -0.007  -0.008  0.006  0.006  -0.008 -0.013  -0.069  -0.078 
 (0.435)  (0.413)  (0.585)  (0.578)  (0.925) (0.884)  (0.616)  (0.574) 
|CAR| News  0.134
c   -0.042    -0.326    -6.981
a  
 (0.058)    (0.209)    (0.674)    (0.000)   
CAR
2 News 0.109    0.032
c   0.592    9.430
b  
 (0.454)    (0.095)    (0.616)    (0.016)   
|CAR| News × POST  0.485
c   -0.016    1.200    1.619   
 (0.085)    (0.849)    (0.421)    (0.623)   
CAR
2 News × POST  -0.777
b   0.029    -3.881    -6.712
c  
 (0.045)    (0.625)    (0.213)    (0.099)   
|CAR| Banned    0.021    -0.130
a   -22.621
a   -202.884
b 
   (0.820)    (0.005)    (0.000)    (0.010) 
CAR
2 Banned    0.061    0.181
b   24.665
a   234.177
b 
   (0.768)    (0.010)    (0.000)    (0.017) 
|CAR| Banned × POST    0.052   0.093    -32.152    102.071 
   (0.743)    (0.141)    (0.103)    (0.536) 
CAR
2 Banned × POST    -0.636    -0.097    85.938
b   -546.743 
   (0.220)    (0.205)    (0.038)    (0.873) 
|CAR| Not Banned     0.132
c   -0.036    0.482   -5.587
a 
   (0.057)    (0.265)    (0.529)    (0.002) 
CAR
2 Not Banned    0.112    0.028    -0.241    7.671
c 
   (0.441)    (0.121)    (0.846)    (0.064) 
|CAR| Not Banned × POST   0.528
c   -0.027    1.985   1.628 
   (0.069)    (0.761)    (0.208)    (0.606) 
CAR
2 Not Banned × POST   -0.820
b   0.030   -5.847    -5.770 
   (0.038)    (0.657)    (0.110)    (0.187) 
N 39,617  39,617  38,634  38,634  30,966 30,966  17,519  17,519 
R
2/ Pseudo R
2 0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.008 0.014  0.039  0.050 










Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of the OLS and logit regressions with firm fixed effects (Firm FE) to explain 
insider stock buying (selling) within 30 calendar days before Good News ( Bad News).  Good News ( Bad News) is an 
announcement that yields non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News (Bad News) announcements the 
dependent variable in the OLS regressions is defined as net buying (net selling) and is calculated as the number of shares 
bought (sold) less the number of shares sold (bought) by insiders over 30 days before the news announcement, scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 100. In the logit regressions the dependent variable equals one for news 
preceded by positive net buying (net selling) and zero otherwise. Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. Additional regression diagnostics F-test 
and Wald Chi
2 are reported for OLS and logit regressions, respectively. 
a, b, 
c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
level, respectively. The sample includes all regulatory news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. See, Appendix B for detailed definitions of the 
variables.   55
Table 6. The Effect of Reputation on Insider Trading by CEOs and Chairmen around News 
Announcements 
  Panel A. 
OLS with Firm FE: 
the amount of net buying before good news 
(net selling before bad news) 
Panel B. 
Logit with Firm FE: 
probability of positive net buying before good 
news (net selling before bad news) 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
CEOs      
Constant -0.021  -0.094
a    
 (0.779)  (0.006)     
LnSize 0.009  0.008
b -0.263  1.689
a 
 (0.474)  (0.011)  (0.111)  (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.000  0.000  -0.003
b 0.017
c 
 (0.268)  (0.387)  (0.020)  (0.076) 
Past Return  -0.005
c 0.006 -0.684
a 0.171 
 (0.094)  (0.126)  (0.000)  (0.128) 
# Boards  -0.003  -0.002  0.163  0.222 
 (0.197)  (0.430)  (0.223)  (0.270) 
Age -0.001  0.001
c 0.002  0.038
b 
 (0.176)  (0.067)  (0.884)  (0.037) 
|CAR| Banned  0.000  -0.029  -25.419
a -23,796.39
a 
 (0.998)  (0.213)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
CAR




 (0.621)  (0.063)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
|CAR| Not Banned   0.256
b -0.006  2.690
b 8.506
b 
 (0.029)  (0.893)  (0.028)  (0.045) 
CAR
2 Not Banned  -0.243
c 0.012 -4.187  -34.664
c 
 (0.088)  (0.762)  (0.177)  (0.070) 
N 26,972  26,724  15,880  5,300 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2  0.001 0.000 0.020 0.087 
F-test / Wald Chi




Chairmen       
Constant -0.093  0.033    
 (0.218)  (0.370)     
LnSize 0.010  0.003  -0.395
a 1.181
a 
 (0.386)  (0.109)  (0.007) (0.001) 
Market-to-Book 0.000  0.000  -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.205)  (0.219)  (0.110) (0.636) 
Past Return  -0.003  0.004  -0.285  0.124 
 (0.254)  (0.229)  (0.288) (0.257) 
# Boards  -0.001  0.000  0.092  -0.781
a 
 (0.166)  (0.489)  (0.242) (0.009) 
Age 0.000  -0.001  -0.013  -0.006 
 (0.234)  (0.169)  (0.625) (0.910) 
|CAR| Banned  -0.016  -0.018  -23.871  22.770 
 (0.821)  (0.379)  (0.121) (0.891) 
CAR
2 Banned  -0.040  -0.001  7.112  -4,272.25 
 (0.865)  (0.979)  (0.939) (0.407) 
|CAR| Not Banned   0.217
b -0.017  2.109  -0.3492 
 (0.049)  (0.445)  (0.150) (0.879) 
CAR
2 Not Banned  -0.254
c 0.036 -7.445  2.640 
 (0.082)  (0.220)  (0.159) (0.254) 
N 27,315  27,023  13,679  3,885 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.000  0.001  0.016  0.063 
F-test / Wald Chi
2 1.36  1.83
c 53.25
a 69.62
a   56
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of the OLS and logit regressions with firm fixed effects (Firm FE) to explain 
CEOs stock buying (selling) within 30 calendar days before Good News ( Bad News).  Good News ( Bad News) is an 
announcement that yields non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News (Bad News) announcements the 
dependent variable in the OLS regressions is defined as net buying (net selling) and is calculated as the number of shares 
bought (sold) less the number of shares sold (bought) by insiders over 30 days before the news announcement, scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 100. In the logit regressions the dependent variable equals one for news 
preceded by positive net buying (net selling) and zero otherwise. Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. Additional regression diagnostics F-test 
and Wald Chi
2 are reported for OLS and logit regressions, respectively. 
a, b, c, denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
level, respectively. The sample includes all regulatory news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the 




 Table 7. Alternative Measures of the Information Content of the News 
 
Panel A. 
 OLS with Firm FE: 
the amount of net buying before good news 
(net selling before bad news) 
Pane B. 
Logit with Firm FE: 
probability of positive net buying before 
good news (net selling before bad news) 
  Good News  Bad News  Good News  Bad News 
CAR[-20,+1]       





 (0.098)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.031) 
CAR





 (0.098)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (6.198) 




 (0.186)  (0.080)  (0.007)  (0.079) 
CAR
2 Not Banned  0.024  0.013  -0.307  -4.735
b 
 (0.635)  (0.334)  (0.590)  (2.023) 
N 40,054  38,197  40,054  38,197 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.002  0.000 0.018 0.039 






CAR[-10,+1]        




 (0.162)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
CAR





 (0.051)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
|CAR| Not Banned   0.090
c -0.036  1.682
a -1.431
c 
 (0.064)  (0.116)  (0.002)  (1.82) 
CAR
2 Not Banned  0.012  0.004  -0.474  0.500 
 (0.837)  (0.841)  (0.552)  (0.582) 
N 39,875  38,376  30,401  16,662 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.002  0.000  0.019  0.045 






CAR[-5,+1]        




 (0.138)  (0.045)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
CAR





 (0.067)  (0.074)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
|CAR| Not Banned   0.117
b -0.032  2.123
a -0.436 
 (0.029)  (0.167)  (0.000)  (0.653) 
CAR
2 Not Banned  0.024  0.021  -1.493
b -0.222 
 (0.752)  (0.173)  (0.045)  (0.905) 
N 39,563  38,598  30,412  17,355 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.001  0.001 0.015 0.044 






Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of the main variables of interest of the OLS and logit regressions with firm 
fixed effects (Firm FE) to explain insider stock buying (selling) within 30 calendar days before Good News (Bad News). 
Good News (Bad News) is an announcement that yields non-negative (negative) CAR News. In the sample of Good News 
(Bad News) announcements the dependent variable in the OLS regressions is defined as net buying (net selling) and is 
calculated as the number of shares bought (sold) less the number of shares sold (bought) by insiders over 30 days before the 
news announcement, scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 100. In the logit regressions the 
dependent variable equals one for news preceded by positive net buying (net selling) and zero otherwise. |CAR| News is the 
absolute value of cumulative abnormal return over different windows: [-20,+1], [-10,+1] and [-5,+1] relative to the news 
announcement. Standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values of the coefficients are 
reported in parentheses. Additional regression diagnostics F-test and Wald Chi
2 are reported for OLS and logit regressions, 
respectively. 
a, b, 
c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. The sample includes all regulatory news 
announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the Regulatory News Service (RNS) between January 1999 and 
December 2002 See, Appendix B for detailed definitions of the variables.   58
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) Buys before good news Sells before bad news
 
 
Notes: This figure presents the number of buys (sells) over 25 weeks before good (bad) news announcements. 
The number of trades in each week is scaled by the average weekly number of trades over the 25 week period. 
The sample includes insider trading before news announcements by U.K. listed companies published in the 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) between January 1999 and December 2002. 
 